Belarus: an unusual electoral cycle

An unhappy anniversary

2024 in Belarus is not only an election year. This year, Alexander Lukashenko will celebrate his 30th anniversary in power. On July 10, 1994, he won his first presidential election in Belarus. Considering the referendums of 1995 and 1996, which abolished the separation of powers, Father has been ruling Belarus alone for thirty years. Its legitimacy has always been based not on ideology but on unique relations with various layers of Belarusian society, the economic and security elite, and neighbouring states. Possessing an undeniably brilliant oratorical talent, Lukashenko has learned to convince people and believe in what he says. It was not for nothing that during his first election campaign, Lukashenko convinced everyone and himself that people, even in death, got out of bed and voted for him.

The only ideological construct that has survived during Lukashenko’s 30 years in power is his statist system in form and leftist in essence, similar to the system of the late USSR. Large industry was preserved in the country (the most modern in the Soviet Union, since the country’s industrialisation began after World War II). Privatisation of industrial enterprises – heavy and transport engineering, oil, chemical and food industries – was not carried out. The state controls 80% of industrial enterprises; in the mid-2010s, state-owned enterprises produced half of GDP and employed half of the working population. Enterprises were subsidised by the state – from direct injections to preferential loans, which made it possible to keep product prices relatively low and wages relatively high. Most of these enterprises worked for one market where they were competitive – Russia (plus several other countries of the former USSR).

Lukashenko’s relationship with the elite (mainly in the civil service) was based on the personal loyalty of officials, heads of state-owned enterprises and security forces. In return, they were provided with a relatively stable and prosperous life. Personnel policy and social elevators for the elite are entirely in the hands of the president – he regularly rearranges and reassigns officials to various posts up to the district level. In general, this policy ensured the loyalty of the elites.

To a large extent, the legitimacy of Lukashenko’s power was based on his relationships with his neighbours, primarily with Russia, individual EU countries and the European bureaucracy as a whole. He began his presidential career as a fighter against “US imperialism” and a supporter of the restoration of the USSR. Then, Lukashenko’s policy became much more flexible. In the 2000s, an ideological construct matured in which Belarus’s sovereignty was proclaimed the highest foreign policy goal, which had to be protected from interference by external forces. In practice, this meant complex manoeuvring between Russia and the EU.

Thunder of protests

And then 2020 came, which changed both Lukashenko and Belarus. Before the 2020 protests, the regime tried to balance between simulating the existence of elections, respect for civil liberties and periodic repression of the most successful opposition and social forces. Previous significant protests, which took place in 2010, were not as massive as those in 2020 but also ended in the persecution of participants and political leaders. 

Against the background of the financial and currency crises of 2014–2015 and the fall in GDP, Minsk tried to revive the economy, accompanied by political liberalisation. In 2015, Western countries began to lift some personal sanctions against the Belarusian leadership, and in 2016, two candidates from registered opposition parties even entered the republic’s parliament. Thus, the regime exhibited the features of classical electoral authoritarianism: elections were cleared of any strong rivals, and their honesty and fairness were imitated. However, the results of electoral procedures still could not be ignored entirely.

Acting within the framework of this model, Lukashenko purged the most dangerous candidates for the 2020 elections while leaving Svetlana Tikhanovskaya on the ballot. But he miscalculated, and instead of a slightly cleaner election with the formal admission of at least one candidate from the opposition, he received so-called “overturning elections” – a situation in which many believed that the current leader received fewer votes than he was credited with, maybe even less, than his primary opponent.

Authoritarian regimes faced with such a miscalculation face a fork in the road: either make concessions and admit defeat, simultaneously bargaining for guarantees of immunity from the victorious opposition, or suppress the protests by force. Alexander Lukashenko made his choice at the moment when he arrived in a helicopter with weapons in his hands, supposedly to defend his residence from protesters. The problem is that the regime cannot afford to exist in a relatively mild form of electoral authoritarianism after this.

The only way for the authorities is a sharp curtailment of any remaining freemen and formal and informal expansion of the powers of the security forces – the last remaining support. After an unacknowledged defeat in the elections and a victory in the confrontation with protesters, Lukashenko completed the cleansing of the remaining opportunities for competition. Most oppositionists and simply public figures were expelled from the country and arrested; online media were eliminated, and independent journalism was equated to a criminal offence. Private small businesses, which took a position of solidarity with the protesters, were closed under patriotic slogans. At the same time, state registrations were revoked from NGOs and civil sector organisations, some of which were not involved in politics but formed horizontal networks of support and mutual assistance that could threaten the regime in a situation of mobilisation of a protest upsurge.

After the suppression of protests and “help” from Russia, Alexander Lukashenko became “incompetent” for the West. He became even more dependent on the Kremlin, even though until 2020, he tried his best to “manoeuvre between the poles of power.” Belarus became a zone of Moscow’s influence, which predetermined Minsk’s position during the period of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Partner in crime

Since the beginning of the war, the regime of Alexander Lukashenko, in fact, has become an accomplice in Russian aggression against Ukraine, providing its territory as a springboard for the invasion. On the night of February 24, 2022, Russian troops landed at the Gostomel airfield near Kyiv; helicopters with paratroopers took off from the territory of Belarus. At the same time, Russian troops, moving out of Belarus, advanced to the suburbs of Kyiv. Missile and air strikes were also carried out from Belarus. However, despite many alarming forecasts, the Belarusian army did not directly enter into an armed conflict.

Moreover, over time, the role of Belarus in the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine became less and less noticeable. A particular status quo had developed, which suited Lukashenko quite well. Official Minsk remained an ally of Putin’s Russia in this conflict, but this role did not require any extra effort from it. He successfully avoided direct entry into the war, and the Kremlin, apparently, did not issue ultimatums to Belarus in this regard. The successful counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kharkiv Oblast and the liberation of Kherson showed that Russia might well lose this war.

Minsk could not help but think about the possible consequences of such a defeat. Lukashenko began to look for a saving “straw.” These are probably the reasons for the intensification of attempts to establish a dialogue with the West.

The issue of political prisoners was a problem in the Western-Belarussian relations. At the beginning of September 2022, Lukashenko started talking about a large-scale amnesty and possible pardon of some prisoners. Two weeks later, Lukashenko unexpectedly pardoned three political prisoners, including the famous Radio Liberty journalist Oleg Gruzdilovich (according to unofficial information, his release resulted from secret negotiations between Minsk and Washington). At the same time, the authorities made it clear that this will not be the end of the matter and the topic of releasing some political prisoners remains on the agenda. It was rumoured that the late Foreign Minister of Belarus, Vladimir Makei, held behind-the-scenes meetings with Western diplomats on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York.

According to Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s senior adviser, Franak Vyachorka, during these meetings, the Belarusian minister suggested that the West “turn the page.” Makei allegedly hinted that now it is necessary to save Lukashenko from Russia. Otherwise, the same “referendums” as in Ukraine’s occupied territories could occur in Belarus. He asked to lift sanctions on the potash industry and promised to gradually release political prisoners if there was no pressure on Minsk. Western diplomats and politicians did not comment on the information about the behind-the-scenes negotiations.

While official Minsk was making timid attempts to come to an agreement with the West, the Kremlin sharply raised the stakes in the war with Ukraine. The mobilisation was announced in Russia, pseudo-referendums were held in the occupied territories of Ukraine, and their annexation was officially formalised. According to experts, such an escalation endangered Belarus from directly entering the war. Lukashenko again began to have “political convulsions” and, as a result, he was forced to demonstrate loyalty to his “big brother” by directly declaring that “Belarus is participating in the [so-called] “special military operation in Ukraine.” But at the same time he emphasised that “we don’t kill anyone” and “we don’t send our military anywhere.” And the role of Belarus in the “special operation” supposedly boils down to ensuring that no one shoots “the Russians in the back.”

On the one hand, Lukashenko would like to reduce his dependence on Moscow. However, a separate agreement with the West will require serious concessions: the release of political prisoners (if not all, then the majority) and a complete withdrawal from Putin’s “special operation.” Such a sharp reversal can seriously demoralise the security apparatus. And besides the security forces, Lukashenko simply has no one to rely on within the country. At the same time, Lukashenko also understands well that Russia’s defeat in this war is not in his interests. Suppose a military defeat leads to a severe weakening or even collapse of Putin’s system. In that case, his regime will be left without any support, along with both the West and the Belarusian people. Lukashenko found himself in a classic zugzwang: any move now worsens his position. But supporting the Kremlin’s course of escalation seems to have become a more acceptable option for him than an open conflict with Putin. The war in Ukraine has become a kind of pivot influencing the flight trajectory of Belarus, both in internal and external orbits.

A formal ritual

February 25, 2024, is a single voting day in Belarus. One hundred ten deputies of the House of Representatives and 12,514 deputies of local councils will be elected. According to political scientist Valery Karbalevich, elections in Belarusian conditions can be viewed as “a formal ritual that does not affect anything.” However, for the authorities, the most valuable thing about them is legitimacy. “This is a way by which the government proves to itself, society and foreign entities why it has the right to lead in this country. This is important for Lukashenko. Besides, it’s a tradition. Neither the nomenclature nor supporters of the current government would understand the cancellation of the elections,” Korablevich believes.

Alexander Lukashenko has his view on future elections. He believes that these elections will be challenging due to the conditions in which the country finds itself. In particular, he noted the uncertainty of the international situation, unprecedented external pressure, information attacks and provocations. He also stated that the opposition is preparing for forceful actions against the authorities.

“If we hold our heads in our hands, everything will be fine. Yes, we will have elections in February 2024. (…) There is no need to relax because these scoundrels who escaped – several hundred of the most active people – are now making moves towards terrorist attacks and so on to earn money. They must show their sponsors that they don’t just know how to fast on Telegram channels,” Lukashenko said.

His speeches certainly convey the trauma of 2020, which does not allow him to live in peace. Hence, the constant mantra-like chants that “the enemy is not asleep,” “you can’t relax,” and “extremists are hatching some kind of plans.” However, after 2020, Lukashenko did everything to paralyse political activity in the country and reduce the role of the opposition to zero.

The authorities prudently sent some of their opponents to jail. At the same time, some of the opposition found themselves in forced emigration and deprived of the opportunity to somehow influence the electoral processes. Most of the electorate, who live and work abroad, were also isolated from participation in the political life of Belarus. In September, the head of the Central Election Commission, Igor Karpenko, said that polling stations would not be formed abroad. According to him, this does not infringe on the rights of citizens who have travelled abroad. Everyone will be able to vote when they come to Belarus.

According to some data, in the last three years alone, up to 350 thousand people could have left Belarus, including due to political persecution. But we can hardly expect that many of them are ready to return to the country to participate in inconclusive elections in the context of ongoing total repression.

Since 2020, hundreds of public organisations have disappeared in the country, and not a single opposition political party has been re-registered. Of the 15 officially registered parties, only four remain: Belaya Rus, first reported only in May 2023, the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, the Communist Party, and the Republican Party of Labor and Justice. At a meeting with them in November 2023, Alexander Lukashenko “explained” to party leaders the purpose of their political structures: “The purpose of parties is not to fight the state, but to compete with each other at the level of projects and legislative initiatives. Everything that is aimed at creation.” In addition, Lukashenko noted: “The benefit of political forces is also to become assistants to the authorities in explaining decisions made.”

The Belarusian leader did not forget those who, on the contrary, interfered with state power for a long time. “During the re-registration of parties, we cleared the party field of decorative associations and those whose activities are aimed at undermining the foundations of the constitutional system of our country… The model of governing the country that we have chosen – a presidential republic – is optimal for our society, considering historical traditions and geopolitical situations. People should not only understand this but accept it as an axiom,” said Alexander Lukashenko.

The liquidation of even half-dead opposition parties deprives opponents of the government of an easy way to get on the ballot and, accordingly, to television debates and other election campaign events. And a self-nominated candidate needs to collect signatures to register as a candidate. This procedure for nominating citizens may end in arbitrary rejection by election commissions. You don’t need to look far for examples: from the 2020 presidential elections, Lukashenko’s most rated rivals, banker Viktor Babariko and former director of the High-Tech Park Valery Tsepkalo, were removed by the Central Election Commission, having “cut down” several hundred thousand signatures they had collected. In the Belarusian public sector and budgetary organisations, there are still dismissals of those who signed in support of opposition candidates in 2020. Therefore, in the conditions of mass purges, the likelihood of opponents of the authorities appearing on the lists of candidates is nearly zero.

Supporters of the government openly declare that they will not allow the opposition to participate in the elections.

“Parties must stand up to defend the country. They must once and for all close the road to the “fifth column” and some politicians. Parliamentary elections – there will be competition among patriotic forces. Presidential elections are planned for 2025. What should the “fifth column” do there? Who should nominate candidates? Patriots,” says the head of the pro-government Liberal Democratic Party Oleg Gaidukevich.

At the same time, the authorities have cleared the media space to limit access to alternative information. Most of the editorial offices of non-state socio-political media have been forced out of the country; they are recognised as “extremist formations”, and the audience of these media in Belarus is under the threat of administrative or criminal prosecution.

For the 2024 parliamentary elections, the authorities cleaned up the “political field” and introduced new game rules. In February 2023, a law amending the Electoral Code of Belarus was signed. The turnout threshold was abolished in the elections of deputies to the lower house of parliament. The authorities have ruled out any risk that elections may not occur somewhere. People with a foreign residence permit or a criminal record are prohibited from being nominated as candidates. Many of the leaders and activists of the “democratic forces” can now be wholly deprived of Belarusian citizenship with the help of sentences in absentia, which many of them have already received.

Voters were also prohibited from taking photos or videos of completed ballots. The filming of ballots in the 2020 elections became an effective way to confirm fraud. The control mechanism and sanctions for violation of removing ballots have not yet been prescribed, but the Central Election Commission may issue relevant instructions. For example, voting booths will have no curtains, and both members of election commissions and the police will closely monitor voters. It is also possible to check multimedia galleries on the mobile phones of “suspicious” voters. The authorities no longer disclose who is on the election commissions. The number of public organisations whose representatives can be observers and serve on election commissions is being reduced.

The 2024 elections combine two campaigns. As a result, rural residents will receive four ballots at once – with candidates for the village council, district council, regional council of deputies and parliament. “This is an overly cumbersome system for voters,” said the campaign Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections.

In addition, experts point out that the Electoral Code retains the most controversial procedures – the non-transparent procedure for counting votes and early voting. In Belarus, the percentage of early voting increased with each campaign, and the opposition always emphasised that early voting provides the most favourable opportunities for vote fraud since no one sees what happens to the ballot boxes at night.

As DW notes, Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections refused observers for security reasons. Former independent observers of the 2020 presidential elections are still subject to massive searches and inspections. These elections will feature an expert commission that collects data from open sources and through an anonymous form for reporting violations.

“Today, the participation of independent observers in elections is a big risk,” explains lawyer Svetlana Golovneva. – The authorities deregistered human rights organisations that previously could legally send observers to polling stations. In addition, some organisations are recognised as extremists and can also be subject to criminal liability.”

This is already the third election campaign in which the authorities have not invited observers from the OSCE. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry stated that the reasons are “simple and understandable”: “the traditional dominance of representatives of Western countries in OSCE missions,” “the introduction of unjustifiably harsh political and economic sanctions by Western countries,” “the deterioration, due to the fault of the West, of logistics opportunities for leaving and entering Belarus.”

As an alternative to observers from the OSCE, the head of the Central Election Commission of Belarus, Igor Karpenko, proposes observers from some European countries, who will be invited individually. “For those who really miss Western observers from the European Union, I want to say that we will have such observers, but they will not be part of the OSCE mission, as was the case before, but will be invited individually from different European countries, and first of all from our closest neighbours,” he informed and added that observers from Poland, Hungary, Germany and other countries will be represented at the elections. The head of the Central Election Commission also said that Belarus will invite representatives of the Central Election Commissions of the CIS countries, the World Association of Electoral Bodies, and the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly’s mission to the elections.

Lawyer Svetlana Golovneva notes that undemocratic authorities are often tempted to organise pseudo-independent observation to have a favourable assessment of elections. When independent observation is banished, trust in elections and their results rapidly declines, says lawyer Pavel Sapelko: “And it cannot be restored through the positions of “friends” in the club of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Observation by authoritative international actors such as the OSCE/ODIHR is intended to improve electoral processes. And this is not interesting to the regime, which remains in power thanks to falsifying election results.”

Non-elections or a ritual without meaning and justice

The experience of 2020 is a trauma not only for Lukashenko but also for the opposition. The authorities are still “picking out” those active in those elections. Security forces are looking for dissenters on social networks and purges of disloyal people at enterprises. In such conditions, people are afraid of being exposed. Long before February 2024, it became apparent: the Belarusian opposition would not only not be able to compete with government supporters but, in fact, even participate in the elections.

It is worth noting that since the late 1990s, only a few deputies have represented the opposition in the Belarusian parliament. And even then, not in every convocation: for example, at the moment, there are simply no parliamentarians who at least partially criticise the authorities. And we can assume that they are unlikely to appear in 2024. From the point of view of the oppositionists in exile, since 2020, Lukashenko has been an illegitimate usurper, which means that the elections he announces are also initially illegitimate.

In her video message, the leader of the “Belarusian opposition”, Svetlana Tikhnaovskaya, formulated her position on the upcoming parliamentary and local elections in Belarus: “The so-called single voting day appointed by the regime is a non-election. A ritual without meaning or justice.” She stated that “the regime has nothing to offer Belarusians except repression” and then called: “Be vigilant and do not be deceived. Avoid participating in regime activities.” Thus, the leading opposition force admitted that in the current circumstances, it would not be able to influence the course of the elections in any way and simply called on Belarusians not to participate in them.

Speaker of the Coordination Council of the Opposition in Exile Andrei Yegorov does not agree with Tikhanovskaya on everything. He notes that the opposition does not have a good strategy for Lukashenko’s elections. “The general message, which may seem understandable: there are no elections in Belarus,” Egorov argues, “but calling for some form of mass protest, some kind of active action, boycotting is not simply due to attention to the situation of mass repressions. But it’s worth taking advantage of this campaign politically.” It will not be possible to seriously harm Lukashenko’s regime or “shatter the regime” in these elections. Egorov explains this by saying society lacks the resources to take advantage of this electoral period.

Political analyst Artem Shraibman notes in his Telegram channel: “This is the first case of such a total refusal to participate in electoral rituals by the opposition since at least 2000. Even in 2022, the democratic forces went to the referendum with the idea of damaging ballots, a tactic of at least some kind of action.”

At the 2022 referendum, Lukashenko’s opponents proposed a “two crosses” strategy (damaging ballots in a vote in which they did not offer an alternative to Lukashenko’s Constitution). The strategy did not work: on the day of the referendum, there were street protests and mass arrests, but they were associated with the beginning of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and not with the idea of “two crosses. The analyst notes that in this situation, one has to choose.

“It’s just that the opposition continues to prioritise external tasks over internal ones because it is unclear whether there is anything to lose inside, but what can be lost in the external arena is absolutely clear. The choice to boycott is to minimise risks. And therefore, I cannot confidently say that for Tikhanovskaya, in the position in which she and her structures find themselves, this is some kind of serious mistake,” the expert sums up.

The participation of the exiled leader of the Belarusian opposition in the Munich Security Conference evidences the prioritisation of external tasks over internal ones. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya held meetings with several Western politicians. Among them are US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Michal Szczerba, Honorary Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Boris Ruge and even former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In addition to the planned ones, there was an unexpected meeting – with Yulia Navalnaya. It was held behind closed doors, and nothing was reported about its details.

Tikhanovskaya voiced her message to the West at the “Belarus and European Regional Security” round table, held as part of the Munich Conference. “The leader of the “opposition” admitted: “We are scared for the lives of thousands of our Belarusian political prisoners. Many of them are being held isolated, and we do not know if they are alive. Among them are my husband Sergei, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Belyatsky, Masha Kolesnikova and many others. We must not allow more deaths in prisons. The moment has come for the democratic world to demonstrate unity and courage.” And she specified exactly how: “This response must include powerful sanctions against these regimes, as well as assistance to all those who fearlessly fight them. It’s time for democracies to show their teeth.”

However, Tikhanovskaya demands that the West take a differentiated approach towards Belarus. She states: “By isolating dictators, we cannot isolate the people. Belarusians want to see an alternative to the “Russian world”. And such an alternative is membership in the European Union and the Council of Europe because Belarus has a European future.” “Leader of the Opposition” assured her listeners, “Belarus under Lukashenko will be a constant threat to European and international security.”

But, having clearly formulated what she wants to achieve, Tikhanovskaya said nothing about what natural ways to achieve these goals the opposition sees. Moreover, she appealed to representatives of Western countries to propose “concrete ideas that will help return Belarus to democracy” right during the conference.

Alexander Lukashenko has his own opinion on Tikhanovskaya’s speech in Munich. At the general meeting of the Belarusian Republican Union of Consumer Societies, he spoke about the secret plans of the opposition. According to information that Lukashenko allegedly has, Tikhanovskaya and her supporters, behind closed doors, declare that Poland has the right to the western lands of Belarus. And in the event of Russia’s defeat, Belarus will grow at the expense of Russia’s western lands: “Read: they will cut us something from the Smolensk, Bryansk, maybe Pskov regions. And we must give western Belarus (as far as Minsk, as you know, there was a border) to Poland.”

Lukashenko directly indicated what Tikhanovskaya was doing at the Munich conference. And he turned to the cooperators, asking, “Which of you can agree with this?” And he himself answered: “Maybe someone can, but I won’t do it under any circumstances. We will fight to the last for our lands. Moreover, we don’t cause problems for anyone. We don’t owe anyone anything. We do not lay claim to Vilna, Bialystochina, Russian or Ukrainian lands. What we have historically got is enough for us. These are our Belarusian lands.”

According to him, representatives of the radical opposition abroad have one goal – war, and his task is to preserve peace and tranquillity in the country. By the way, not a single speech of his and almost not a single talk show on Belarusian TV now passes without thanks to the leader for a peaceful sky. Russia’s war against Ukraine gave the Belarusian regime a very convenient position: “No matter how much of an iron curtain they surround the country, no matter how painfully the sanctions hit it, our men are not driven into the trenches, and rockets do not fall on our heads.”

On the other hand, when talking about peace, Lukashenko does not forget that gunpowder must be kept dry. Therefore, Belarus has been militarizing for almost two years now. Former security officials occupy senior positions in civilian structures – from museums to the High Technology Park. The defence budget has grown by nearly 40% in 2023 and will increase by another 30% soon. Exercises in different regions and other military branches are carried out non-stop. The “Wagnerites” remaining in the country pass on their experience to the Belarusian army. In the internal troops, new special forces units are springing up like mushrooms to fight opposition saboteurs. Lukashenko even shared details of the arrest of saboteurs carried out the day before. “With the help of drones, some of the Ukrainian citizens crawled through the swamps to our border, transported explosives to commit sabotage, primarily on the territory of Russia and Belarus,” Lukashenko painted a gloomy picture. He also noted that the Belarusian opposition abroad depends entirely on Western funding. “If they don’t give them money now, their time is numbered. Therefore, they are trying to prove that they can do something and are preparing everything for the elections.”

Another “lifeline” for the opposition is a change in the external context in connection with Russia’s defeat in the war with Ukraine. According to experts, if, as a result of Russia’s defeats, some kind of political turbulence begins, then in Belarus, it will be a different framework and strategic opportunities for opponents of the regime. However, the current “Opposition 2.0”, even if Russia is defeated, can easily repeat the path of the old opposition when the internecine struggle within the opposition itself is stronger than the struggle with the regime.

And the first alarm signals began to arrive. There is a crisis in the Coordination Council of the Belarusian Opposition today. This structure appeared at the very beginning of the 2020 protests when democratic forces hoped that dialogue with the authorities in Belarus would be possible. The presidium then included Maria Kolesnikova and Maxim Znak, who were soon detained and sentenced to 11 and 10 years in prison.

In 2022, the composition of the Constitutional Court has renewed abroad and began to position itself as a Belarusian proto-parliament. In 2023, the leadership of the structure even announced that it would hold elections that would become an alternative to the Unified Voting Day organised by the authorities on February 25, 2024. However, this did not happen, and the elections to the Constitutional Court were postponed to May 25.

As DW notes, the speaker of the Coordination Council, Andrei Egorov, refuses to call the situation a “crisis,” although he admits there are contradictions in the structure. In his opinion, this is due to the formal end of the term of office of the Constitutional Court and its independent extension, which some delegates did not support. In addition, in these conditions, a paradox arises because if the delegates leave and the Constitutional Court’s powers expire, then it is unclear how to organise new elections. In turn, Vice-Speaker of the Constitutional Court Elena Zhivoglod explains her decision to leave the structure to the presence of a severe crisis of the Constitutional Court. According to her, over the past year, members of the Constitutional Court have failed to win the trust of Belarusians and fully implement the idea of what the council should have become. The former vice-speaker and the organisation she heads, “Honest People,” do not plan to participate in the new Constitutional Court elections, which are scheduled for May 25.

Political analyst of the publication “Pozirk” Alexander Klaskovsky recalls that even from the beginning of the work of the second convocation, there were questions about the opacity of the formation of its composition, and the work of the Constitutional Court was constantly accompanied by scandals. He calls the current situation with the elections an unfortunate failure: “They promised to make the elections to the third convocation of the Constitutional Court direct and with the involvement of a wide number of citizens of Belarus and, moreover, as an alternative to the Single Voting Day or “no elections,” as the “democratic forces” called it.” As a result, the “democratic forces” failed their plan. When this happens, it discredits the very idea of democracy.”

New presidential elections await Belarus in 2025. The February 2024 elections are only the first preparatory stage for the main election campaign. It will help test how effectively the adopted necessary legislative changes and all the system’s cogs work in practice, from election commissions to the security forces, who have more and more powers.

However, the subsequent formation of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (VPA) as a super body will become a severe test for the authorities on the way to the 2025 presidential campaign and an essential stage in the future transformation of Lukashenko’s regime.

Politburo named after Lukashenko

After the parliamentary elections, another more important campaign will take place in the country – the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (VPA). Critics of the regime have already managed to “christen” it as “Lukashenko’s Politburo.”

The first All-Belarusian People’s Assembly took place back in 1996. At that time, a political crisis was raging in the country, caused by the struggle of the Supreme Council with President Lukashenko. The head of state decided to get additional popular support and convened a representative forum. The meeting helped Lukashenko hold a referendum, as a result of which the president dissolved the Supreme Council and formed a controlled parliament. The next three meetings – in 2001, 2006 and 2010 – were held on the eve of the presidential elections, giving the head of state a platform for hours of speeches. Oppositionists have traditionally criticised these events, comparing them with the congresses of the CPSU.

In 2020, after the presidential elections, crowds of Belarusians who disagreed with the voting results went out to protest. Against this background, Lukashenko started talking about a new constitution. At the same time, he promised that after adopting the amendments, he would leave his post. “I don’t do it for myself. I will no longer work with you as president of the new Constitution. Therefore, calm down, bear it calmly,” Lukashenko said.

Amendments were made to the country’s Constitution, which prescribed a new constitutional body – the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. According to the plan, the president’s powers were to be significantly reduced, and all power was to be concentrated in the hands of the head of the praesidium of the Supreme National Assembly. This would allow Lukashenko to painlessly leave the post of head of state and take a position even with greater opportunities than the formal leader of the country. The Supreme National Assembly was given the right to appoint judges, approve the government, recognise or not recognise the legitimacy of elections, introduce martial law, and even dismiss the president. It’s no secret to anyone that the seat of the chairman of the Supreme National Assembly with enormous powers is reserved – the Constitution gives the right only to the first president of Belarus to hold both posts simultaneously until 2035. There is no reason yet to expect that Lukashenko will fulfill his promises that he made immediately after the 2020 protests and will not seek a new presidential term in 2025. Today, the government has completely stabilised, nothing threatens Lukashenko, and therefore, a redistribution of power most likely will not happen. According to the base scenario, he will combine both central positions in the country as long as this is politically and biologically possible.

As for the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, it will consist of 1,200 people. It will include almost all members of parliament, the Belarusian Women’s Union, the Republican Youth Union, the Belarusian Public Association of Veterans and the Federation of Trade Unions. The particular law on this body, which claims to have the status of a modern veche, states that various officials, starting with Lukashenko, will also become delegates. From the executive branch, this also includes the Prime Minister, his deputies and other members of the Council of Ministers, and chairmen of regional and district executive committees. The legislative branch will consist of Supreme and Constitutional Court judges in the Supreme National Assembly. They will meet once a year. But an interesting and new phenomenon for Belarus will be the emergence of its own Politburo – the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of 15 people. Of course, with Lukashenko alive, the influence of these people will be small. However, the composition of the Belarusian Politburo, resignations and appointments in it, as in Soviet times, will become signals about who is rising and falling today in the informal hierarchies of Lukashenko’s inner circle.

In the end, it is from this circle that Lukashenko’s future successor will most likely emerge. Today, there are many versions of how the transition of power will take place. According to one version, Lukashenko will become the head of the Supreme National Assembly, and his successor will be the President of Belarus in 2025. It’s hard to say whether he will take such a step. As the experience of Kazakhstan shows, such a reshuffle can have unpredictable and highly negative consequences for rulers who remain in power. There is a Turkmen model when the stability of the outgoing president can be ensured in almost one case – if the post of the outgoing head is taken not even by an ally but by a close relative and, best of all, a son. Probably, for Alexander Lukashenko, this would be the ideal and best of all models. However, the most realistic version seems to be that he will head the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. In 2025, he will run for president, especially since the Constitution does not prohibit him from this step.

One way or another, the formation of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly and the election of its praesidium will formalise a new configuration of the regime, and it may lead to a redistribution of influence between representatives of Lukashenko’s inner circle. The further development of the situation in Belarus will largely depend on how painlessly the system can go through this stage of transformation.