Afghanistan: three years under Taliban rule

Coming to power

The Taliban movement was born in 1994 among Afghan Pashtuns, who make up 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s population. Members of the group were recruited from among refugees who left the country because of the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989 and received religious education in madrassas in Pakistan (the name comes from the Arabic ‘talib’ – student or learner). Some experts believe that the Taliban movement is a product of Pakistani intelligence. The movement’s goals were proclaimed to be the removal of the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, which had been in power since 1992, and the introduction of Sharia law in the country. 

The first military clashes between government troops and Taliban detachments took place in the autumn of 1994. Already in September 1996 they occupied Kabul and until 2001 were actually in power, proclaiming the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their government was recognised only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On the territory under their control the Taliban established a regime based on strict enforcement of Islamic law, cruel punishments were introduced for violating the orders – beheading, stoning, public executions. In 1998, the Taliban seized about 90 per cent of the country’s territory. 

Only a small area in the north-west of the country remained under the control of the anti-Taliban forces (Northern Alliance). Due to the fact that the Taliban-controlled territory was home to the bases of the terrorist group ‘Al-Qaeda’ and its leader Osama bin Laden, the UN Security Council in October 1999 adopted a resolution demanding the extradition of bin Laden. At the same time, UN sanctions were imposed on the Taliban and an arms embargo was imposed in December 2000. Finding themselves in international political isolation, the Taliban went to confrontation with the world community: in March 2001, they blew up in Bamiyan the largest statues of Buddha, the age of which exceeded 1500 years. In the summer of 2001, the Taliban launched a large-scale offensive in the north of the country, consolidating their position in the city of Taluqan.

After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 organised by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s refusal to extradite Bin Laden, the USA and Great Britain launched the military operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 (later the countries that joined them formed the International Security Forces in Afghanistan – ISAF, the leadership of which was taken over by NATO). The goals of the military operation were stated to be liberation of Afghanistan from Taliban influence, destruction of terrorist bases and capture of Al-Qaeda leaders. By December 2001, the Taliban regime was overthrown, the militants retreated into the mountains and began guerrilla warfare. It was the Taliban’s actions during the five years of their rule in Afghanistan (1996-2001) that became one of the ideological bases for the invasion of the country by US troops and their allies in 2001. The Americans came not only to destroy the base of terrorists from ‘Al-Qaeda’, responsible for the attacks of 11 September and who had taken refuge in the Taliban state, but also to free the Afghan people from the ‘savagery’ of their rulers.

Many Taliban and al-Qaeda members have fled to Pakistani territory. Having established themselves in the north-western part of Pakistan (on the border with Afghanistan), they actually created there in 2005 a ‘state within a state’ – ‘Islamic State of Waziristan’, which ceased to exist only in 2009 after a number of major operations of the Pakistani army. Then, despite the presence of US and NATO contingents in Afghanistan, the Taliban regained influence in several parts of the country.

In 2014, with all provincial and most district centres under government control in Kabul, a gradual drawdown of coalition troops began. By 2015, military units from all ISAF participating countries except the US had withdrawn from the country. In accordance with the agreement with the Afghan government, the U.S. left a contingent of 9,800 troops (later increased to 12,000), whose tasks included training Afghan security forces and conducting counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda militants. On 1 January 2015, a non-combat NATO Resolute Support mission was launched in Afghanistan on 1 January 2015 to train Afghan security forces, police and army personnel.

After the NATO combat mission ended, the movement, which at the time numbered 50,000-60,000, continued its war with Afghan government forces. Since 2015, the Taliban has significantly expanded its zone of influence in Afghanistan. According to a report by the US government’s inspector general for reconstruction in Afghanistan (SIGAR), if in 2015 the government retained power in 72% of the country’s districts, with 7% under Taliban control and 21% disputed, then in 2019 the government held, only 35% of the country’s districts, the Taliban 37%, with the remaining territories remaining disputed.

The Afghan government has repeatedly tried to enter into negotiations with the Taliban, but those put forward preconditions – to recognise them as a legitimate political force and withdraw US troops from the country. Only in 2015-2016, with the mediation of the United States, China and Qatar, several rounds of direct talks were held between representatives of the government and the Taliban, but the parties were unable to agree on any point when discussing the peace process. In autumn 2018, negotiations with Taliban representatives were started by the US (the movement was not listed as a terrorist organisation in the US). They were held in Doha (Qatar) and Abu Dhabi (UAE), the Afghan government did not take part in them. 

On 29 February 2020, the US and the Taliban signed an agreement in Doha to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan and launch a peace process in the country. The US pledged to reduce the number of troops from 12,000 to 8,600 within 4.5 months and to withdraw the remaining military within one year and two months, not to interfere in the internal politics of the country and to refrain from the use of force. The agreement envisaged the lifting of US sanctions against Taliban members (imposed in 1999) and facilitating the removal of the Taliban from the UN sanctions list. In return, the Taliban agreed to cease terrorist and military activities and to refuse to cooperate with other terrorist organisations. The agreement also envisaged inter-Afghan negotiations involving the Taliban, the Afghan government and the country’s legal political forces. 

As confidence-building measures, by the time the negotiation process was launched, the Afghan government was to release up to 5,000 Taliban members from prison in exchange for 1,000 members of the security forces held by the Taliban. On 9 March 2020, the US began its withdrawal. The prisoner exchange ended on 11 September 2020. Inter-Afghan talks began in Doha in September 2020, were repeatedly interrupted and failed to produce any results.

Against the backdrop of the US troop withdrawal, which began on 29 April 2021, clashes between the Taliban and Afghan security forces broke out across the country. In July 2021, the Taliban took control of areas along the borders with Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, PRC, and Pakistan. In August, the Taliban captured a number of towns and centres in Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, Herat, Baghdiz, Ghor, Kunduz, Takhar, Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Baghlan, Faryab, Sari Pul, Jawzjan, Samangan, Ghazni, Zabul, Badakhshan, and Logart provinces. In some of them, the administration and security forces surrendered to the radicals, while in others there was fighting, including with the use of heavy weapons. 

In some provinces, security forces coordinated their efforts with local militias formed by representatives of regional jihadist organisations opposed to the Taliban. On 15 August, Taliban fighters approached Kabul but did not storm the city. After the surrender of the capital by government forces, the movement’s representatives rejected the proposal to create a transitional government and demanded that they be given direct control of Afghanistan. The U.S. bet on the creation of a coalition government did not play out. In case of its formation on more or less equal terms and the presence there of representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban, the US would have had an opportunity to create a picture of a successful settlement of the conflict and leave Afghanistan ‘without losing face’. 

In addition, the format of the coalition government would have allowed the US to keep at least part of the pro-Western establishment in power and thus retain control over political processes in Afghanistan. However, Washington’s plans collapsed. The peace agreements, in fact, were unilaterally implemented only by the US, which withdrew its troops according to the agreed schedule, while the official negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban collapsed. Therefore, the entire further process of the transit of power was decided in the course of behind-the-scenes agreements between a part of the Afghan establishment and the Taliban leadership. It was these informal agreements that apparently predetermined the following mechanism of the Taliban’s accession to power.

Firstly, at the highest political level, the Afghan leadership directly sabotaged the entire system for managing and coordinating the resistance to the Taliban. As it turned out later, key political and military officials of the Afghan government were involved to varying degrees in collusion with the Taliban. For example, parliamentarians in the northern province of Badakhshan accused the Afghan government of preventing the destruction of Taliban bases in the province for years. 

Second, the Afghan leadership has done everything possible to disrupt the mobilisation and arming of popular militias (Basij) in the country’s provinces and cities. The government delayed the creation of the militia to the last minute; only in late July and early August, when the situation on the fronts became catastrophic, did the Afghan government finally appeal to the population to sign up for the militia. Despite this, sabotage continued: for example, eyewitness accounts show that when the Shibirgan militia ran out of ammunition, the local garrison refused to help them, citing instructions from above.

Thirdly, in a significant number of cases, the Afghan authorities on the ground facilitated the surrender of settlements in every possible way, often acting as intermediaries between the Taliban and community elders. Thus, the vast majority of districts and towns came under Taliban control on the basis of agreements between local informal leaders (warlords, clergy, community leaders) and Taliban commanders. The surrender agreements were based on the formula ‘loyalty and submission in exchange for security guarantees and inviolability of property’. The same agreements were made with military garrison commanders and heads of local administrations.

It is difficult to say to what extent corruption was involved in the organisation of government sabotage and to what extent big politics was involved. Most likely, a number of factors played a role here: political considerations, behind-the-scenes collusion, direct bribery of officials, a management crisis, blackmail (there is evidence of threats to the families of Afghan pilots and officers), and so on. The existence of behind-the-scenes collusion between the top brass of the Afghan government and the Taliban seems to be the main factor that led to the victory of the radical movement. It should be noted that the backroom deal itself could not have led to such a rapid fall of the pro-American government. The main factor was still the failure of the American strategy in Afghanistan in four key areas: nation-building; resolution of the Afghan crisis; implementation of socio-economic and political transformations; and ideology. Let us start with the issues of nation-building. 

The US and NATO initially had a too simplistic view of the situation in Afghanistan and therefore were simply not prepared for the need to untangle the complex knot of internal Afghan contradictions and problems. The main question was whether the future Afghanistan should be a Pashtun nation-state, as it has been since its foundation, or a federal entity where the minorities of the north would have at least proportionally equal access to resources and power. 

Since the Soviet invasion, the traditional, centuries-old political and ethnic balance in the country has been radically upset – during the 1980s and 1990s, the minorities of the north gained control of military and economic resources and could no longer accept the unequivocal political dominance of the Pashtun majority. In turn, the Pashtuns were equally adamant in not accepting the new realities and political-military arrangement. It was for this reason that many Pashtun tribes supported the Taliban, which they saw as virtually the only force capable of bringing the situation in the country back to normal. When the West came to Afghanistan, it decided to bet on returning the country to the format of a national Afghan (Pashtun) state – partly because of Pakistan’s position, partly out of the belief that national minorities could not ensure control over the entire territory of the country. 

The government of Hamid Karzai and then Ashraf Ghani, with the full support of the Americans, made every effort to split the Northern Alliance, bribe and neutralise their leaders, and drastically reduce its political potential. Both presidents consistently pursued a policy of Pashtunisation of the administrative apparatus and power structures in the northern provinces. The problem was that NATO’s only and natural ally at the local level was the Northern Alliance, which represented the interests of national minorities, while the Taliban opposing the Western coalition had traditionally been based on the Pashtun majority. As a result, the Northern Alliance was destroyed and the process of re-Pashtunisation, quite naturally, ended with the Taliban in power. 

In addition, none of the four U.S. administrations has been able to reduce corruption in Afghanistan. On the contrary, by 2021, corruption had reached almost catastrophic levels, permeating all structures, from civilian institutions to the police. According to unofficial data, the army and police have developed the practice of so-called ‘dead souls’, when a significant number of soldiers exist only on paper, although significant funds are allocated for their maintenance. All this caused deep resentment and discontent among the population and drastically reduced the government’s popularity in the country. 

The national settlement process also failed, as did the US security and military strategy. For some reason, from the very beginning Washington built the Afghan army as a police structure, i.e. as a force to maintain order, rather than a modern army capable of conducting large-scale military operations on its own. Therefore, the Afghan army was actually unable to conduct combat operations on its own and without massive air support. With regard to ideological issues, the Afghan Government has never been able to provide society with a national idea that could unite the entire population of the country. In turn, the Taliban leadership has been able to develop an extremely effective propaganda system in recent years, largely borrowing the methodology and approaches of ISIS.

In general, Taliban propaganda was based on several postulates and slogans: ‘the Taliban came to power to end war and corruption’; ‘the Taliban today are not the same as they were before’; ‘the new society will be organised as a single community, without singling out any class or part of it’. Against the backdrop of widespread corruption and government inefficiency, Taliban slogans began to look more attractive to many citizens, especially in the southern, Pashtun provinces of the country. In the north, however, the popularity of not only the government but also former Northern Alliance leaders, who were accused of corruption and conformity, as well as betraying the interests of their communities, plummeted. All of this undermined the willingness of people in the northern provinces to turn against the Taliban, although they were not particularly sympathetic to the Taliban, they were not willing to take up arms to save an unpopular and corrupt government. 

On the other hand, the soldiers and officers of the Afghan Army (ANA) have been increasingly ideologically disoriented since President Karzai’s rule, either by the president’s statements urging them to fight the Taliban implacably or by calling the Taliban leader ‘his dear brother’. Ideological confusion also played a negative role in organising anti-Taliban resistance. Under the influence of state propaganda, Afghan society was set up for a gradual peace process that would end with a treaty with the Taliban and the establishment of a coalition government. As a result, society was completely unprepared for the new reality – the collapse of the peace process and the Taliban coming to power. Consequently, the former Northern Alliance structures and their potential allies were also taken by surprise and therefore simply did not have time to organise themselves.

All of these factors ultimately created favourable conditions for the Taliban to seize power so quickly and relatively bloodlessly shortly after the US withdrawal began.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

Once in power, the Taliban declared a willingness to engage with the world and even establish an inclusive government. This was stated in the Doha Agreement. The Taliban promised that the country’s leadership would include not only Pashtuns – the traditional members of the movement. In reality, however, things turned out differently. On 19 August they proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and almost a month later, on 11 September 2021, on the twentieth anniversary of the terrorist attacks in the United States, the Taliban flag was raised over the presidential palace in Kabul, marking the symbolic start of the work of the state apparatus fully formed by the Taliban. 

The government that was labelled transitional remains so three years later, as if to confirm the adage that nothing is more permanent than temporary. At the time, the names of the government members echoed a list of the most powerful Taliban. On the eve of the announcement of the government’s composition, Abdul-Ghani Baradar, who signed the historic agreement with the US on 29 February 2020, was expected to head the government. However, the post went to another veteran of the movement, Mohammad Hassan Akhund. He was the foreign minister and first deputy chairman of the previous Taliban government that existed until 2001. 

Mr Akhund was also close to Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, clearly demonstrating the continuity of the new government. Mr Akhund still heads the government with a short break when he handed over the reins to Abdul Kabir for two months in 2023 for health reasons. The already mentioned Mullah Baradar, along with Abdul-Salam Hanafi (the only Uzbek in the entire government), took the posts of first and second deputy head of government, who represented the diplomatic wing of the Taliban. Abdul Ghani Baradar, a Taliban veteran, is the most public face of the Islamist group with nearly 30 years of history. Amir Khan Mottaki took over as foreign minister. During the first Taliban rule (1996-2001), it was he who negotiated on behalf of the movement with the UN. 

The power bloc was no less ‘honoured’. Mullah Mohammed Omar, the eldest son of Taliban founder Mohammed Omar, became defence minister of the new Afghanistan. And the post of Interior Minister went to Sirajuddin Haqqani – the son of the founder of the group ‘Haqqani Network’, and for the last few years – the deputy supreme leader of the Taliban Haibatullah Akhundzada. Another member of the Haqqani family, Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, took up another important post, that of migration minister. The General Staff was in turn headed by Qari Fasihuddin, an ethnic Tajik who nevertheless commanded the suppression of the Tajik militia in the Panjsher Gorge. Another Tajik in the new government is Mohammad Hanif, Minister of Economy, a native of the northern province of Badakhshan. Thus, the ethnic composition of the Taliban government can be described as very homogeneous – all Pashtuns, with the exception of two Tajiks and one Uzbek.

At the top of this power pyramid is Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, who is the spiritual leader of the Taliban and head of the new state entity Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He took over the Taliban movement in May 2016, days after the second leader in the Taliban’s quarter-century history, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, was killed in a US drone strike in southwestern Pakistan. Akhundzada is often referred to as a sheikhul-hadith. This is a Sunni title showing his high authority on the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. 

Recently, information that the ‘lord of the faithful’ Haibatullah Akhundzada is seriously ill has become increasingly frequent in Afghanistan. In particular, one of the UN reports said that due to the coronavirus he had suffered twice, he has problems with his lungs and kidneys. This means that it is not excluded that in the near future a redistribution of spheres of influence and a struggle for power may begin among the Taliban. During three years in power, the Taliban have avoided serious internal disagreements and splits, although their opponents abroad from among fugitive and interested foreign politicians have repeatedly stated about growing contradictions within the Taliban top brass. Nevertheless, the Taliban leader’s failing health could be a tempting factor in straining relations within the ruling elite.

According to the London-based satellite channel Afghanistan International, the Taliban leadership is currently split into three key opposing camps. The first group is led by Abdul Ghani Baradar, deputy head of the interim government, who favours negotiations with the US and progressive reforms in Afghanistan. The second wing includes a Taliban paramilitary offshoot led by acting defence minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqub, son of the first Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. The third militant faction is represented primarily by the Haqqani terrorist network, led by acting Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. In particular, Haqqani criticised the Taliban supreme leader last February: ‘Monopolising power and imposing your views is damaging the reputation of the whole system and is definitely not in our interest.’ However, it is not possible to confirm with certainty that there is fierce fighting between the groups. On the surface, the Taliban generally appear to be monolithic and united.

As for the Taliban’s personnel policy, after coming to power in 2021, despite numerous talks about amnesty for all those who worked for the overthrown government or co-operated with foreign soldiers, the Taliban began to carry out repression against them. Especially the representatives of the Hazara people, who profess Islam, unlike the Pashtuns, Shiite Islam, were targeted. In the first months of their rule, the Taliban killed hundreds of former soldiers, officers and officials of the deposed government. Executions were carried out without any courts. Only those who had defected were granted amnesty. Once abroad, former Afghan soldiers, officials and civilians who had co-operated with foreign contingents said they feared returning to their homeland, where they would face retaliation from the Taliban. 

Over time, however, the situation began to change dramatically. With a shortage of qualified officials, economists, and soldiers, the Taliban created the Return Commission. It conducts negotiations with fugitive Afghans. Only in the first year of its work it managed to persuade hundreds of representatives of the government overthrown in August 2021 to return to Afghanistan. For example, Dawlat Waziri, a former defence ministry official, returned to Afghanistan. Even earlier, fleeing Deputy Foreign Minister Idris Zaman, Peace Minister Abdul-Salam Rahimi and Transport Minister Hassan-Mubarak Azizi, one of the closest associates of Afghan Uzbek leader Marshal Abdul-Rashid Dustum, Nizamuddin Qaisari, returned to the country. 

As observers note, the Taliban have mostly negotiated the return of members of the Pashtun ethnic group to the country. Some of them have proven themselves to be egregious corruptors during the previous government, such as Amanula Ghalib, former head of the state energy company DABS. Nevertheless, the process of bringing back ‘old’ cadres has had a positive impact on Afghanistan’s economy. Having drawn certain conclusions from the past, the Taliban have brought professional economists from the overthrown government to economic issues, rather than former madrasa students. This, by the way, was noted by experts of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in their study ‘Afghanistan’s Socio-Economic Prospects for 2023’.

The weak link

Despite the fact that the Taliban report on the stabilisation of the country’s economy, it continues to be its weakest link.

One of the most important achievements of the Taliban in their first year in power was that they managed to avoid mass starvation, despite what many experts predicted. The fact is that after the Taliban took over power in Kabul, virtually all international humanitarian organisations and foreign governments curtailed their aid programmes to Afghanistan. In addition, about $9 billion of Afghan state assets were frozen in foreign banks. That triggered a sharp economic downturn.

However, after three years, UNDP researchers have noted some signs of recovery in the Afghan economy, such as a relatively stable exchange rate for the Afghani, which has appreciated in value against other foreign currencies. Customers can withdraw more money from individual deposits made before August 2021. The World Bank described the Taliban government’s tax collection as ‘healthy’ and pointed out that most basic necessities are affordable to Afghan citizens, although demand is low. All of this was greatly helped by the Taliban’s rapid takeover of the finance ministry and central bank structures of the ousted government. 

Retail spaces that were initially empty are once again full. The grassroots economy is working. It is poor, but there is no total devastation. Only a stratum of those who were tied not to the national economy but to servicing the foreign presence has disappeared. But an important caveat is necessary: the current of peaceful life is fuelled from outside. Aid is flowing into the country through the UN and other international organisations. There are no exact statistics, but it is probably between 1 and 2 billion dollars a year. Such support is enough to finance the work of basic social infrastructure and to support domestic demand, which is what the grassroots economy works on. Compared to the donor injections made into Afghanistan under the previous authorities, the current amounts are quite small. 

The Taliban government considers the fight against corruption to be another of its significant achievements over the past two years. Thus, according to a World Bank study, since the Taliban seized power, the share of businesses bribing customs officials in Afghanistan has fallen from 62 per cent to 8 per cent.Tighter border controls have also led to a significant increase in registered exports and customs revenues.

For example, total revenue for the year from March 2022 to March 2023 was $2.3 billion, up 10 per cent from two years earlier. The decline in corruption, experts say, is partly because there is not as much money to steal, and partly because the Taliban have legalised many parts of the informal economy. The Taliban can also take credit for stopping the smuggling of foreign currency abroad, including controlling the popular hawala system throughout the Middle East of unrecorded currency transactions, often in the form of barter. So the increase in exports, muted inflation and demand for labour suggests a slight stabilisation in the country’s economy. In addition, as Ahmad Zahid, the Afghan government’s deputy minister of trade and industry, notes, authorities have established ‘economic, trade, transit and investment linkages in the region.’ 

In early January 2023, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mojahed announced a contract with China’s CAPEIC (Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co) to develop an oil and gas field in Afghanistan. Under the contract, the Chinese will be given priority rights to extract oil and gas from deposits in the Amu Darya Basin in the provinces of Sari Pul, Jawzjan and Faryab. For this, the Taliban will be paid about $150 million a year, and after three years the amount will increase to $540 million. Afghanistan also has deposits, the value of which is estimated at $1 trillion. Chinese companies are showing interest in them. One of them, Gochin, is offering the Taliban $10bn for access to lithium deposits. The company will build roads, tunnels and will process lithium. Now China provides 60 per cent of lithium processing in the world and will seriously increase its share at the expense of Afghanistan. This is a serious challenge for the US and Europe.

Nevertheless, the same UN and World Bank experts have stated that one third of the population lives below the poverty line. 70 per cent of Afghanistan’s residents cannot meet their needs for food, health services and employment, and the country’s banking system is on the verge of collapse. The economic downturn in Afghanistan has affected all sectors of the economy. The service sector, which accounts for 45% of the country’s GDP, has shrunk by 6.5%. The agricultural sector, which accounts for 36% of GDP shrank by 6.6%. Industry declined by 5.7% as women-owned businesses closed. 

In addition, the Taliban banned the cultivation of opium poppies, the raw material for opium production. This has had an impact on the fight against drugs in the world, but has affected the country’s economy. Afghanistan itself speaks of the negative impact of this situation on the economy. While in 2015 opium poppy cultivation and opiate trade contributed 16 per cent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP), in 2021 it will contribute only 9 per cent, with a maximum of 14 per cent, the UN said. Although opium poppy cultivation was banned in 2022, its share of the country’s GDP is expected to rise again. However, this is mainly due to a general decline in Afghanistan’s economic performance since the Taliban came to power. According to DW, the ban is also severely affecting the country’s population. Opium production employs a large number of people. Without the ban, ALCIS estimates 450,000 people would be working full-time in poppy cultivation in 2022. 

In Afghanistan’s Helmand province alone, farmers and harvesters would have earned $61 million in 2022. The hardest hit by the ban are small farmers who have little land or seasonal labourers who have no land at all. Not only do they lose direct income, but they also suffer wage cuts in other sectors indirectly affected by the ban. ‘The Taliban justified the ban on opium poppy cultivation on the grounds of religious requirements. The Afghan population has been reluctant to accept the ban. This is because most Afghans do not object to an order based on an Islamic interpretation of the law. According to their self-perception, otherwise they would oppose Islam itself. This logic was also a problem for the previous government. It was not perceived as truly Islamic. Therefore, it had no legitimacy in the eyes of the population to impose such a ban.

According to UN experts, among the key reasons for the generally dire socio-economic situation remain: restrictions in the banking sector, the weakening and isolation of state institutions, and the lack of foreign investment and donor support for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. Public institutions, especially in the economic sector, continue to lose the necessary level of competence, including through the dismissal of female professionals. 

Jihad against women

Three years of Taliban rule have been marked by an unprecedented attack on the rights of Afghan girls and women. As UN experts noted in their report: ‘Nowhere in the world has there been such a massive, systematic and comprehensive attack on the rights of women and girls – limiting all aspects of their lives under the guise of morality and through the instrumentalisation of religion’. The Taliban claim to be committed to implementing their interpretation of Islamic law – Sharia – in Afghanistan. This leaves no room for anything they consider foreign or secular. This is exactly the same policy of discrimination against women that the Taliban promoted in the late 90s when they first seized power in the country. This time around, the Taliban promised a ‘softer’ regime compared to their first period of rule from 1996 to 2001. At least that is what many wanted to believe. However, the promises have not materialised: the Taliban have tightly controlled half of the country’s population – women. 

Control of women is one of the political and religious pillars of the Taliban. This has become especially evident in the last 20 years: now the policy on women is a direct response to the ideology of the US and its allies. Yes, in 1995 the ‘women’s issue’ was also important, but back then the Taliban needed to win the war and take over the whole country. Today, the status of women has become inseparable from the Taliban’s struggle against foreign influence, particularly US influence. So this is not a gender issue in the narrow sense, it is a question of their vision for the future of the country. The Americans’ goal was to change the status of Afghan women. What we are seeing now is an attempt by the Taliban to go against the US.

In three years in power, the new government has made it mandatory for all women to wear burkas, an outer garment that completely covers the body and face. In addition, women are banned from parks, gyms, universities, and the right to work in non-governmental organisations and UN structures has been taken away. ‘The Taliban ordered the closure of beauty parlours across the country: now women have even fewer opportunities to work and spend their free time socialising with each other. These decrees followed a ban on girls over the age of 12 going to school in the first year of Taliban rule and a decree issued by the Ministry for the Promotion of Islamic Virtue and Prevention of Vice to make the hijab compulsory for women. Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada praised the changes, saying the lives of Afghan women have only improved since the departure of foreign troops and the introduction of mandatory hijab. 

Earlier this year, Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada announced that the movement would begin enforcing its interpretation of Sharia law in Afghanistan, including the reintroduction of public flogging and stoning of women for adultery. ‘You can call it a violation of women’s rights when we publicly stone or flog them for committing adultery because it is against your democratic principles,’ he said. He justified the move as a continuation of the Taliban’s fight against Western influence. In the past year alone, Taliban-appointed judges have ordered 417 public floggings and executions, a research group that tracks human rights in Afghanistan. Of those, 57 were women.

In August 2024, the Taliban published a series of new laws on ‘vice and virtue’ approved by their supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. They state that women must completely conceal their bodies, including their faces, under tight clothing at all times in public so as not to lead men into temptation and vice. Women’s voices are also considered potential instruments of vice and therefore will not be heard in public under the new restrictions. Women are also not to sing or read aloud, even while in their homes. ‘Whenever an adult woman leaves her home out of necessity, she is required to conceal her voice, face and body,’ the new laws state. Men will also be required to cover their bodies from navel to knees when they are outside their homes. From now on, Afghan women are also forbidden to look directly at men who are not related to them by blood or marriage, and taxi drivers will be penalised if they agree to give a woman a lift without a suitable male escort. 

Women or girls who do not comply with the new laws can be detained and punished in a manner deemed appropriate by Taliban officials responsible for enforcing the new laws. The restrictions were condemned by Roza Otunbayeva, the UN special representative for Afghanistan, who said they continued the ‘intolerable restrictions’ on the rights of women and girls already imposed by the Taliban since taking power in August 2021. Mir Abdul Wahid Sadat, president of the Afghan Bar Association, said the new laws contradict Afghanistan’s domestic and international legal obligations. ‘Legally, this document faces serious problems,’ he said. ‘It contradicts the fundamental principles of Islam, gld the promotion of virtue has never been determined by force, coercion or tyranny. Not only does this document violate Afghanistan’s domestic laws, but it generally contradicts all 30 articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ 

Unexpectedly, Afghan women began to fight back. Across the country, women have begun uploading videos of themselves singing, in defiance of the Taliban’s systematic efforts to cut women out of the public sphere. Foreign governments, international human rights and humanitarian organisations condemned the Taliban for restricting women’s rights, but in practical terms, neither the outrage nor the UN’s unsubstantiated threats improved the lives of Afghan women.

Threats and security

Another ‘trick’, which the Taliban proudly reports on, is the fight against crime. So in the period from April 2023 to March 2024, the crime rate in Afghanistan decreased by 30 per cent. According to the Afghan Interior Ministry, for the first time in 40 years the country can be recognised as safe and its inhabitants can travel around the provinces of the country without fearing for their lives. For a long time, the main destabilising factor in Afghanistan has been the activities of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-Khorasan). The latter, is an ideological enemy of the Taliban and periodically attacks Taliban leaders. 

When the Taliban occupied Kabul in mid-August 2021, they first seized the National Directorate of Security of Afghanistan prison building and released the prisoners – all but nine of whom they executed on the spot. One of those killed was a man known by the alias Abu Omar Khorasani – formerly one of the leaders of the Afghan branch of the Islamic State. It was ISIS that claimed responsibility for a series of deadly attacks outside Kabul airport on 26 August 2021 that killed more than 100 people. A Taliban spokesman sharply condemned the atrocities. 

Terrorist attacks have become a common tool of the IS-Khorasan fight in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the geography and scale of IS-Khorasan terrorist attacks are constantly decreasing, but they still pose a security threat to the country’s residents and Taliban officials. In 2023, for example, a member of the group blew himself up in the administration of the northern province of Balkh, which borders Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The Taliban-appointed governor of the region, Mohhamad Dawood Muzzamil, was killed. He became the highest-ranking Taliban official to be killed by ISIS militants since the Taliban took power. 

In January and March 2023, attacks by IS-Khorasan militants on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry building, located in a heavily guarded government quarter of Kabul, killed a total of more than 20 people. Militants of the same group carried out an armed attack on the popular Longan Hotel in the centre of the Afghan capital in December 2022. Three people were killed in the terrorist attack. However, ‘IS – Khorasan’ is not limited to the territory of Afghanistan. In April 2024, it took responsibility for a terrorist attack on the territory of Russia. On 3 April, the terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow killed 145 people and injured 551 others. At the time, the Taliban condemned the attack, calling it a terrorist attack and a violation of human standards. In response, IS-Khorasan issued a statement accusing the Taliban of adopting the values of ‘infidel’ nations: ‘The Taliban are now part of the nation of infidels. Therefore, it is only natural that they will sympathise with them and share grief with the infidels.’ 

The rhetoric and actions of the Taliban, explicitly indicate that they see the terrorist organisation ISIL as the main threat and focus on it in the context of their anti-terrorist policy. ‘The Taliban defines ISIL as an ‘external organisation’ and therefore fighting it is a religious duty. ISIS, on the other hand, recognises the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan in the context of its global strategy and sees a strong Afghan government as an obstacle to its goals.

From time to time, the Taliban carry out operations against ISIS settlements in various provinces of Afghanistan and neutralise individual armed elements. In addition, by fighting ISIS, the Taliban are trying to convey to the international community that they are true to the commitments made in the Doha Agreement of 29 February 2020: Afghanistan will not become a place of terrorist threats against other states. Today, Taliban spokesmen say the Islamic State terrorist group does not have a strong position in the country because it has been defeated. ‘We do not agree with all the reports labelling the IS as a threat and danger to Afghanistan. IS has been defeated, its lairs have been destroyed and it cannot recruit supporters,’ emphasised Hamdullah Fitrat, a Taliban spokesman. He also criticised the UN, accusing it of spreading false reports about the IS presence in Afghanistan and the organisation’s ability to attack other countries from Afghan territory. The Interior Ministry stressed that neighbouring countries have not provided evidence of threats from Afghanistan as the Emirate is safe in this regard.

However, in early September, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in the Afghan capital, killing six people. It was the IS group that claimed responsibility for the attack. Thus, the report of UN Secretary General António Guterres, published earlier this year, which stated that the threat from IS in Afghanistan ‘remains high’ despite all the assurances of the Taliban, is most likely true and the terrorist group is far from being defeated. The Taliban’s limited financial and economic resources have prevented them from taking the fight to a scale capable of ending ISIL, as well as other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan. 

In addition to IS-Khorasan fighters, the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Masood, son of the renowned warlord Ahmad Shah Masood (1953-2001), opposes the regime. The MNLF advocates the complete overthrow of the Taliban regime and the restoration of the republic. According to the FNS, any negotiations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are meaningless and will not lead to any results, as confirmed by all previous consultations between the international community and the militants. Therefore, according to the FNS, it remains to act by force. They periodically report on their resources in social networks about successful operations conducted against the Taliban. However, it is not possible to verify the authenticity of the FNS reports on the eliminated Taliban or to assess the scale of their resistance in different parts of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there are many indications that the FNS has ‘deflated’ and is virtually invisible today. Some experts attribute the ‘fading’ of the FSN’s activity to the decline in support from both the West and Tajikistan, which are more interested in establishing various forms of cooperation with the Taliban than in confrontation.

«The Taliban» and the world

The last time the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan in 1996-2001, their government was recognised by only three countries: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Now the radicals’ Cabinet is not recognised even by them. Moreover, in February 2023, the Saudis evacuated the staff of their embassy in Kabul to neighbouring Pakistan for security reasons. Even Qatar, where the Taliban’s political office has been located since 2013, criticises the radicals’ policies. ‘The Taliban’s actions are disappointing and a step backwards for Afghanistan,’ said Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al-Thani.

Russia, on the other hand, is one of the few countries actively developing relations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban ruling there remains a ‘terrorist organisation banned in Russia’, but this does not prevent Moscow from inviting representatives of the movement to economic forums and discussing ambitious projects with them. Russia expects serious benefits from friendship with Afghanistan, including new trade routes to mitigate Western sanctions, strengthening Moscow’s reputation as an ally of the Global South, and the proximity of the Kremlin’s anti-Western narrative to the Taliban’s ideology, which is based on opposing Western values. 

At the end of May 2024, statements by Russian officials began to appear in the media about the need to remove the Taliban’s status as a terrorist organisation. And Russian President Vladimir Putin said: ‘There are problems in Afghanistan, they are unconditional, everyone is well aware of them. The question is how to build relations with the current government, but we have to build them somehow. These are the people who control the country, control the territory of the country, they are the power in Afghanistan today. We have to proceed from the realities and build relations accordingly. 

The Taliban’s diplomatic efforts generally boil down to finding common ground with various countries and offering options for mutually beneficial co-operation. In particular, the construction of a trans-Afghan railway from Uzbekistan to Pakistan, in which Russia is taking part. The TAPI gas pipeline project (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) is also of interest to Russia. But all of them are far from being realised, primarily because of security problems in Afghanistan itself. Also, the agreement on the construction of a combined heat and power plant in northern Afghanistan by Russian specialists is still only on paper. A promising direction is to increase the supply of raw materials from Russia. The Taliban need this against the backdrop of the dire situation in the Afghan economy. Therefore, Russia’s intention to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorist organisations does not necessarily indicate a willingness to recognise the Taliban as the legitimate authority of Afghanistan. Statements of recognition are only a tool to put pressure on the Taliban to fulfil the promises they made when they came to power. 

Most likely, Russia, as well as other countries, will hold this lever to the last. Russia is not the only country that is making steps towards the Taliban. Kazakhstan was ‘ahead of the planet’. In June this year, Astana said it had taken the movement off the list of terrorist organisations in order to develop deeper economic relations. Among other countries, Uzbekistan, where a Taliban representative arrived at the Afghan diplomatic mission, and Azerbaijan, which opened an embassy in Kabul this spring, have demonstrated their desire to establish relations with the Taliban. Turkey is also moving in a similar direction, having established imports from Afghanistan and is also discussing opportunities to invest in the country’s economy. 

An important indicator of the absence of international isolation of the ruling Afghan regime is the position of China. Earlier this year, Xi Jinping accepted credentials from Taliban ambassador to China Bilal Karimi. China thus became the first country to officially recognise a diplomat of the new Afghan administration. Actually China has its own ‘diamond interest’ in the Taliban government. The richness of Afghanistan’s territory in minerals was the main reason for this increased interest. After the withdrawal of Western business from the country, China has clearly shown that ‘no place is empty’. In addition, Sino-Afghan co-operation can also be seen in the political sphere. The Chinese authorities hope that the Taliban will help them solve the problem of ‘Uighur militants’ fighting for the independence of Xinjiang and hiding on the territory of Afghanistan. China does not see co-operation with the Taliban as a threat to its security, nor does it see it as a threat to its image. 

In Iran, the Taliban’s arrival was initially greeted with alarm on the one hand and hope on the other. The reason for the anxiety was that in the Taliban’s first rise to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s, they became Iran’s ideological rival. It got to the point that Iran was even providing the U.S. military with information on targets to strike to topple Taliban power. At first, after the Taliban’s second coming to power, Tehran was wary of what was happening. However, after the Taliban finally established themselves in power and control over the situation in Afghanistan, the anxiety has gone and at this stage Afghan-Iranian relations can be called quite working. 

One of the main projects in bilateral relations is the Chabahar port in southern Iran. In May of this year, Iran and India concluded an agreement under which this only Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean will be transferred to India for 10 years. Afghanistan was involved in the negotiations for this project as it will be able to use it for its exports. Not the most encouraging side of bilateral relations are the Taliban’s periodic forays to Iran’s borders with the seizure of checkpoints and border guards. According to experts, these outbreaks are related to drug trafficking, which is ‘roofed’ by certain people on both sides, as well as the not fully resolved issue of the border in hard-to-reach places. However, these sorties have so far not led to serious consequences. 

Afghanistan’s relations with its closest neighbour Pakistan can be described as ambiguous. On the one hand, Pakistan has in the past ideologically supported the Taliban and, by and large, was directly involved in its creation in order to influence the processes taking place in Afghanistan. In 2021, Islamabad became the first city where Taliban diplomats were officially stationed in the Afghan embassy. However, over the past time there have been rifts between the countries. Recently, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Reza Naqvi said that relations with Afghanistan will be favourable only when its territory is no longer used against Pakistan. This was stated in connection with the recent terrorist attack in Pakistan, for which the group ‘Taliban Movement of Pakistan’ took responsibility. Interestingly, Pakistan’s ally China has volunteered to reconcile the countries, promising the Taliban new investments in Afghanistan if Kabul takes control of the terrorists responsible for the attack.

Despite the expansion of diplomatic contacts with Russia, China, Central Asian and Middle Eastern states, the new authorities in Kabul remain unrecognised in the world and unrepresented in the UN, where Nasir Ahmad Faik, appointed by the previous government, is still the country’s post-ambassador.

Moreover, Russia’s active rapprochement with the Taliban is strongly opposed by the United States. Thus, John Kirby, coordinator of strategic communications of the White House National Security Council, said that the Taliban has not fulfilled any of the commitments made after coming to power. ‘We have no reason to recognise the Taliban, and if Russia does, it will send a bad signal to everyone,’ Mr Kirby said.

As Bloomberg notes, a senior US administration official told the agency that the US has no intention of recognising the Taliban or reopening its embassy in Kabul. According to the official, the US has made it clear to the Taliban that there are obstacles such as the situation with women’s rights in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Washington sees its main goal as maintaining ties with the Afghan people as well as providing them with humanitarian assistance. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the Americans officially handed over Afghanistan to the Taliban under the Doha Agreement and the U.S. and the Taliban itself is not on the list of terrorist organisations, although it includes, for example, Pakistan’s Tahrik-e-Taliban and more than 70 other different groups.

Bloomberg reports that France, Britain and Germany, as well as the United States, have no plans to reopen diplomatic missions in Kabul in the near future. Nevertheless, a French official in a conversation with Bloomberg admitted that the situation with zero presence in Afghanistan cannot be maintained indefinitely. But the countries of Southern Europe are somehow trying to revitalise their relations with Kabul. Thus, Italy conducted a ‘reconnaissance mission’ in Kabul with the participation of Italian intelligence services. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani confirmed that the Italian ambassador in Doha (Qatar) had visited Kabul. Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares said in an interview with the agency that Spain would return the ambassador to Kabul ‘as soon as the minimum security conditions are in place.’ He said Madrid was already ready for such a move a month ago, but ‘unfortunately, three Spaniards were killed in an ISIL terrorist attack in Afghanistan.’ An unnamed senior European diplomat told the agency that officials in Brussels are now inclined to recognise the need for a presence in Afghanistan, particularly to protect women’s rights and establish a strategic presence in the country.

In addition, the activities of terrorist groups such as IS-Khorasan inside Afghanistan could also make a difference in the Taliban’s relations with Western countries. This may force the West to a more pragmatic partnership and even open up the possibility of returning its diplomatic and intelligence assets to Afghanistan. In this case, much will depend on the Taliban itself, which at some point will have to realise that a flexible, compromise approach to domestic politics will be a more reliable means of avoiding the loss of power than systematic and indiscriminate recourse to repressive mechanisms.

To date, three years after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, more and more countries are trying to engage with them, but it is premature to talk about a process of full diplomatic recognition.

In summarising the results of their three-year rule, it should be noted that the Taliban have failed to fully meet both positive and negative expectations. The Taliban have not abandoned their principles. They see themselves as liberators of the country from foreign occupation. They believe they have earned their victory and are entitled to their power. No constitution, no elections, no inclusive (essentially a coalition government with ‘not their own’). The Taliban’s right to power derives from their ability to take and hold that power. No other approach exists for them yet…